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It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. We conclude that the Fourth Amendment would permit the protective sweep undertaken here if the searching officer "possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on `specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]' the officer in believing," Michigan v. Corporal James Rozar announced that he would "freeze" the basement so that no one could come up and surprise the officers. If something less than probable cause is sufficient, respondent argues that it is no less than individualized suspicion - specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that there are persons on the premises who are a threat to the officers. Our cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Second, the justification for the search incident to arrest considered in Chimel was the threat posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen third parties in the house.

Once inside, the potential for danger justified a standard of less than probable cause for conducting a limited protective sweep. But despite the danger that inheres in on-the-street encounters and the need for police to act quickly for their own safety, the Court in Terry did not adopt a brightline rule authorizing frisks for weapons in all confrontational encounters. In that case, however, the search warrant implied a judicial determination that police had probable cause to believe that someone in the home was committing a crime. 85 (1979), in which we held that, although armed with a warrant to search a bar and bartender, the police could not frisk the bar's patrons absent individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person to be frisked was armed and presently dangerous. 1 (1989) - strikes the proper balance between officer safety and citizen privacy. 321 (1987), that "[a] search is a search," id., at 325, or with our refusal in Hicks to sanction a standard less than probable cause on the ground that the search of a stereo was a "cursory inspection," rather than a "full-blown search," id., at 328.

Beyond that, however, just as in Terry and Long, there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger. Second, the justification for the search incident to arrest in Chimel was the threat posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen third parties in the house. The case is remanded for application of the proper standard. The Court today holds that Terry's "reasonable suspicion" standard "strikes the proper balance between officer safety and citizen privacy" for protective sweeps in private dwellings. 2 In any event, the Court's implicit judgment that a protective sweep constitutes a "minimally intrusive" search akin to that involved in Terry markedly undervalues the nature and scope of the privacy interests involved. [ Footnote 2 ] Individual police officers necessarily initiate street encounters without advance planning "for a wide variety of purposes." Terry v. And, of course, officers could select a safer venue for making their arrest. [ Footnote 4 ] The protective sweep in this case may have exceeded the permissible temporal scope defined by the Court. On remand, therefore, the state court need not decide whether the "reasonable suspicion" standard is satisfied in this case should it determine that the sweep of the basement took place after the police had sufficient time to "complete the arrest and depart the premises." Ante, at 336. California, supra, allowing police officers without any requisite level of suspicion to look into "closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched," ante, at 334, is equally disquieting.

No warrant was required, and as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched. First, Chimel was concerned with a full-blown, top-to-bottom search of an entire house for evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, not the more limited intrusion contemplated by a protective sweep. (c) The Court of Appeals applied an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard in requiring a protective sweep to be justified by probable cause. Terry and its early progeny "permit[ted] only brief investigative stops and extremely limited searches based on reasonable suspicion." United State v. But this Court more recently has applied the rationale underlying Terry to a wide variety of more intrusive searches and seizures, 1 prompting my continued criticism of the "`emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision'" from a narrow exception into one that "`swallow[s] the general rule that [searches] are "reasonable" only if based on probable cause.'" Place, supra, at 719 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result) (citations omitted). I agree with the majority that officers executing an arrest warrant within a private dwelling have an interest in protecting themselves against potential ambush by third parties, see ante, at 333, but the majority offers no support for its assumption that the danger of ambush during planned home arrests approaches the danger of unavoidable "on-the-beat" confrontations in "the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street." Terry, supra, at 12. But officers choosing to execute an arrest warrant in the suspect's house may minimize any risk of ambush by, for example, a show of force; in this case, at least six armed officers secured the premises. 12 (1969) ("[W]e can see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require"). [ Footnote 6 ] The Court's decision also to expand the "search incident to arrest" exception previously recognized in Chimel v.

A jury convicted Buie of robbery with a deadly weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony. But once the police are lawfully within the home, their conduct is measured by a standard of reasonableness . We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand this case to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress the running suit, stating in part: "The man comes out from a basement, the police don't know how many other people are down there. The State introduced the running suit into evidence at Buie's trial. "Traditionally, the sanctity of a person's home - his castle - requires that the police may not invade it without a warrant except under the most exigent of circumstances. The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

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